DECISIONS by unknown
NYLS Law Review 
Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) 
Volume 1 
Issue 1 NEW YORK LAW FORUM, vol 1, 1955 Article 23 
January 1955 
DECISIONS 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
DECISIONS, 1 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (1955). 
This Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
DECISIONS
DomsTic RELATIONS-INvALIDIT oF VIGIN IsLANDS STATUTE MAKING SIx WEEKS'
PHYsIcAL PFmES CE PRnxA FAcE EVIDENCE OF DOiICILE IN DIVORCE AcTos-The
United States Supreme Court has sustained a judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, affirming the dismissal of a bill of divorce by the District Court
of the Virgin Islands for want of jurisdiction.1 The bill had been filed by the plaintiff
immediately following the completion of six weeks' continuous presence in the Islands,
as permitted under section 9(a) of the Virgin Islands divorce law.2 This section
makes six weeks' "presence" prima fade evidence of domicile, and avoids the neces-
sity of proving domicile if process is served personally or the defendant appears gen-
erally.
The Supreme Court now holds that the Virgin Islands Organic Act3 did not em-
power the Islands' Legislative Assembly to enact such a divorce law. As pointed out
by the Court, the Assembly's power to legislate was limited by Congress to the en-
actment of laws of "local application" only, and that the law in question was not con-
cered with local needs, but was designed to attract tourists.
The United States acquired the Virgin Islands by purchase from Denmark in 1917.
By the Organic Act of 1936, Congress empowered the Legislative Assembly of the
Islands to enact laws on "all subjects of local application not inconsistent with . . .
this title or the laws of the United States made applicable to said Islands."
4 This
Act also gave the District Court of the Virgin Islands jurisdiction over all divorce
cases.5
In the exercise of the power conferred upon it by Congress, the Legislative
Assembly in 1944 passed a divorce law which made six weeks' "residence" of an
"inhabitant" sufficient to give jurisdiction to the local court in divorce cases.
6 In
1952, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit construed "inhabitant" and "resi-
dence" to mean "domiciliary" and "domicile". 7 A subsequent amendment by the legis-
lature making six weeks' "physical presence" alone sufficient for divorce jurisdiction
was vetoed by the Governor. However, the Legislature then enacted section 9(a),
which was in effect at the time this divorce action was brought.
8
Territories are divided into two classes: (1) those which are incorporated, having
the potentiality for statehood; and (2) those which are unincorporated, which are
1 Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U. S. 1, 75 S. Ct. 553, 99 L. Ed. 445
(1955).
2 Bill No. 55, 17th Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands of the United States,
3d Sess. (1953). Section 9(a) reads as follows: "Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 8 and 9 hereof, if the plaintiff is within the district at the time of the filing of
the complaint and has been continuously for six weeks immediately prior thereto, this
shall be prima fade evidence of domicile, and where the defendant has been personally
served within the district or enters a general appearance in the action, then the Court
shall have jurisdiction of the action and of the parties thereto without reference to
the domicile or to the place where the marriage was solemnized or the cause of action
arose."
3 49 Stat. 1807 (1936), 48 U. S. C. § 1391.
4 49 Stat. 1814, 48 U. S. C. § 1406(4).
G 49 Stat. 1807, 48 U. S. C. § 1405(a).
6 Bill No. 14, 8th Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands of the United States,
1st Sess. (1944).
7 Burch v. Burch, 195 F. 2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952).
8 Supra, note 2.
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not thought of as future states.9 Legislative power of the "incorporated" territories
extends to rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution or
laws of the United States.1 0 However, the legislative power of the "unincorporated"
territories, of which the Virgin Islands is one, is restricted to laws of "local appli-
cation"1 1 or laws "not locally inapplicable."'
2
Congress, in passing the Organic Acts of Alaska1 3 and Hawaii, 14 both incorporated
territories, specifically limited local jurisdiction over divorce cases to those actions in
which the plaintiff had resided in the territory for at least two years. It did not ap-
pear reasonable to the Supreme Court in the instant case that Congress intended to
give the Islands more freedom in the field of divorce legislation than that enjoyed
by the incorporated territories.
"Local application" clearly implies a limitation to the needs of the inhabitants and
is restricted to relations within the Islands.' 5 The Court said that the issue was whether
Section 9(a) was "concerned with the needs and interests of the local population."' 0
In 1940, 34 divorces were granted in the Islands (1.4 divorces per 1,000 popula-
tion). After the Divorce Act of 1944, however, the divorce rate rapidly increased un-
til the peak was reached in 1952 with 343 divorces (143 divorces per 1,000 population).
The annual figure dropped to 236 in 1953, and between January and November, 1954,
only 111 divorces were granted.1 7 This decrease was probably due to the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Alton v. Alton,'18 which held Section
9(a) to be in violation of the "due process" guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution
and the Virgin Islands Organic Act. Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the Alton case, the subject matter became moot during the intervening period and
there was no disposition of the case on the merits.
There has been a wide disproportion between marriages and divorces in the
Islands. The United States Census in 1950 showed that only 416 widowed or di-
vorced men and 1,105 widowed or divorced women resided in the Islands. The divorces
in 1951 totaled 312, or only 104 less than all the widowed or divorced male popula-
tion of the Islands.19 Two components of the Islands, the Municipality of St. Croix
and the Municipality of St. Thomas and St. John, are nearly equal in population. In
1940, St. Croix granted 18 divorces and St. Thomas and St. John 16. However,
St. Croix granted only 33 in 1952, while St. Thomas and St. John granted 310. The
only explanation for this disparity is that, due to greater facilities, more tourists go
to St. Thomas and St. John.2 o
9 Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U. S. 308, 309, 57 S. Ct. 764, 769, 81
L. Ed. 1122, 1128 (1936).
10 E.g., 37 Stat. 514 (1934), 48 U. S. C. § 77.
11 Supra, note 3.
12 Christianson v. Kings County, 239 U. S. 356, 36 S. Ct. 114, 60 L. Ed. 327
(1915).
3. 37 STAT. 514 (1912), 48 U. S. C. § 45.
14 31 STAT. 150 (1910), 48 U. S. C. § 519.
IS Puerto Rico v. Shell Oil Co., 302 U. S. 253, 58 S. Ct. 167, 82 L. Ed. 235
(1937).
16 Supra, note 2.
17 Supra, note 1 at 13, 75 S. Ct. 553, 560, 99 L. Ed. 445, 453.
18 Alton v. Alton, 205 F. 2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. granted, 347 U. S. 610,
74 S. Ct. 736, 98 L. Ed. 987 (1953).
19 STATISTiCAL ABSTRACT o " THE UNrrx STAi-s: 1954, p. 939 (U. S. Bureau of the
Census 1954).
20 See Virgin Islands Report, pp. 125-127, Sen. Comm. on Interior and Insular
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As pointed out by the Supreme Court, the leading proponents of the earlier,
vetoed version of 9(a) had frankly stated that their purpose was to attract an out-
side "divorce business." The decision also noted the contrast between the six weeks'
divorce domicile provision, and the one-year residence requirement for voting. Taken
all together, these findings raised "controlling doubts" in the minds of the Court as to
the "local" application of Section 9(a), which, in the Court's opinion, was not con-
cerned with the needs and interests of the local population, but rather was designed
"for export".
The instant decision, while concerned only with the divorce laws of a non-sover-
eign jurisdiction, seems to point the way toward a closer examination of the domicile
requirements of those states where "divorce business", as a chief contributor to local
prosperity, continues to attract foreign litigants.
DoAxEsic RELATIONs-RG3T or TwELvE YEAR O CmD TO CHOOSE HM OWN
RELIGION DEsPiTE CONTRARY ANTENupT= AGREEMENT BETWEEN PaRENTS.--The Court
of Appeals, by a divided court, has affirmed a decision of the Appellate Division that
a twelve year old boy is not bound to pursue his religious education in accordance
with an antenuptial agreement made by his parents before he was born and enforced
by the Supreme Court when he was eight years old.1
Appellant and respondent, the parents of the boy, Malcolm, entered into an
antenuptial agreement that all children of their union were to be raised in the Roman
Catholic faith. The husband was a Catholic, and the wife at the time of the marriage
was a Lutheran. Malcolm, the only child of the marriage, was born in 1940 and bap-
tized as a Catholic. When Malcolm was about six years old, his mother, contrary to
the agreement, brought the child to a Christian Science Sunday school.
In 1949, an annulment action was brought by the husband, based on the breach
of this antenuptial agreement. The wife prevailed in her counterclaim for a separation
and obtained the custody of Malcolm. The judgment provided, however, that the boy
be educated in the Roman Catholic religion, pursuant to the antenuptial agreement,
and that he be required to attend a parochial school.
Malcolm had attended Christian Science Sunday school regularly during the two
and one half years prior to the 1949 decree. He then began attending Catholic serv-
ices every Sunday with his father, and transferred from public school to a parochial
school.
This situation continued until June, 1952, when the mother brought a motion
seeking modification of the 1949 judgment and asking that the boy be permitted
to attend the public schools and receive instruction in Christian Science. She asserted
that the child had been mentally disturbed, unhappy, misplaced and ill-adjusted due
to the transfer to the parochial school; and she asserted that it was the personal and
individual desire of Malcolm to attend public school and the Sunday School of the
Christian Science Church.
At the hearings before the referee in January, 1953, when the boy was twelve
years old, evidence was presented that in addition to attending Catholic Church serv-
Affairs, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); VIII ViRGiN ISLANDS MAGAznm (Special Edition
1954) 7 et seq.; MuRRAY, THE CO cmrLETE HANDBSoo oF THE V3RGIrN ISLANDs 12-100
(New York, 1951).
1 Martin v. Martin, 308 N .Y. 136, 123 N. E. 2d 812 (1954).
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ices with his father every Sunday since May, 1949, Malcolm had also attended Chris-
tian Science services on Wednesday evenings with his mother since the summer of 1951.
This last appeared to have been at the boy's personal request and insistence.
The referee questioned Malcolm at length and reported that:
"The boy is now over twelve years of age. He has testified, he has testified intelli-
gently, he is a boy who has a mind of his own. I know of no way that this Court
can make a decree which would strip him of his independent judgment in matters
of this kind ...
"This Court is only concerned with this boy's welfare, and I am completely con-
vinced that neither the mother's wishes nor the father's wishes should control what
is here to be done, but, rather, I propose to do that which I believe is best for the
boy, and I am going to grant the application made."
The Appellate Division affirmed, without writing a majority opinion.2 Two of the
judges dissented, arguing that a child's religious preferences must be guided by his
parents until his mind is sufficiently mature to make his own decisions. The view of
the dissent was that this degree of maturity could not be reached at the age of twelve,
and that the mother should be required to fulfil her promise to obey the earlier de-
cree of the court3
The Court of Appeals, in affirming per curiam, found:
... ample evidence to support both the findings that the youngster was old enough
to testify intelligently and the conclusion that the modification was for his best interest
and welfare. .... 4
Two more judges dissented in the Court of Appeals. The minority opinion took
the position that enforcement of the antenuptial agreement would certainly not injure
the boy. They disputed the assertion that a child of twelve was competent to make
a choice of such significance, and cited a number of New York statutes( to show that
children of various ages suffer legal incapacities which are reflected in protective legis-
lation.
This decision of the Court of Appeals holds that the child's welfare is para-
mount, and that a child old enough to testify intelligently should be allowed his own
choice in matters of religion, notwithstanding an antenuptial parental agreement to
the contrary. It seems that this decision brings the law of New York into accord with
the general rule of England, and of the other jursdictions of the United States.
ATTOniEzs' LIENs-HEEL APPLiCALE To SETTLEziENT or FOREIGN JUDOMENT.-In an
action to enforce an attorney's lien on a cause of action, judgment for defendants was
reversed.' H. P. Drewry, an English corporation, obtained a judgment in Great Britain
2 283 App. Div. 721, 127 N. Y. S. 2d 851 (1st Dep't 1954).
3 Id. at 722, 127 N. Y. S. 2d at 856.
4 Supra, note 1.
5 Ibid.
6 N. Y. ALcOHOIC BEVERAGE CONTROL L. §§ 100, 126; PARI-MuvuAL REVENUE L.
§ 8; N. Y. Dowr. REL. L. §§ 15-a, 72; N. Y. LABOR L. § 130; N. Y. EDUC. L. Art. 65,
Part I; N. Y. GEN. CiTy L. § 18-b; N. Y. PENAL L. §§ 484, 486; N. Y. PEns. PRop. L.
§ 163; N. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDIToR L. § 260; N. Y. JUD. L. § 474; N. Y. CORRECTON
L. § 485; N. Y. VEH. AWD TR. L. § 20; N. Y. CoNsT. art. VI § 18; N. Y. MENTAL
HYGIENE L. § 132; N. Y. Soc. WELT. L. § 373; N. Y. CODE Caa. PRo. §§ 483, 913-m;
N. Y. CrrY Dom. REL. CT. AcT, § 88, subd. 5.




against Onassis, and retained plaintiff attorneys to bring a New York action to enforce
that judgment. While the New York action was pending, Drewry and Onassis, de-
fendants in the instant case, reached a settlement of their controversy without plain-
tiff attorneys' knowledge. In deciding for the plaintiffs, the Appellate Division pointed
out that an attorney's lien attaches to a settlement reached between litigants, both
under a recognized rule of the common law and by statute.2
Section 475 of the Judiciary Law provides that an attorney who has appeared
for a party in litigation has a lien upon his client's claim or cause of action, as well
as upon the proceeds thereof. Furthermore, this lien cannot be affected by any settle-
ment the parties may arrive at, either before or after judgment.
As an English judgment is recognized in New York on the principle of comity,3
and as such a judgment creates a cause of action, the situation is one which is clearly
covered by the provisions of Section 475.4 It follows, therefore, that the attorney
plaintiffs, from the time they commenced the New York action on behalf of Drewry,
had a lien upon Drewry's cause of action and upon the proceeds that might be realized
therefrom. This right was not affected by the settlement independently made between
the parties who are defendants in the instant cases.
In construing Section 475 in 1938, the Appellate Division, First Department, ruled
that "the statutory lien of an attorney is not limited to the proceeds of the action in
which the services were rendered, but attaches to his 'client's cause of action' and to
any recovery thereof even though in a different action." 5 The statute was held to
be remedial in character and to be construed liberally, so as to aid the Legislature's
intent to furnish security to attorneys by giving them a lien upon the subject of the
action. 6
At common law, an attorney had a "special", or "charging" lien for his services
rendered in procuring a judgment, decree or award for his client, 7 in addition to his
retaining lien.8 The rationale which justifies the conferral of this right, was expressed
by the Supreme Court of Kansas as follows: "Courts have never hesitated to give an
attorney a lien for his fees upon a fund which his labors have created or assisted to
bring into existence unless some consideration of public policy or other reason stood
in the way of such equitable allowance." 9 This lien does not rest upon possession, but
is founded on the right of an attorney to be paid his fees and disbursements out of
the judgment which he has obtained for his client, and was given recognition in this
form by early English decisions.1 0 In most of the States in this country, the attorney's
rights depend entirely upon statutes, the constitutionality of which has been upheld. 1
Many of these statutes have greatly enlarged the scope of the common law charging
2 N. Y. JUDiciARY L. § 475.
3 New York, L. E. & W. Ry. Co. v. McHenry, 17 Fed. 414 (2d Cir. 1895).
4 Heakes v. Heakes, 157 Ga. 863, 122 S. E. 177 (1924); Topeka v. Ritchie, 102
Kan. 384, 170 Pac. 1003 (1918); Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U. S. 235, 40 L. Ed. 133,
16 S. Ct. 171 (1895).
5 Matter of Lourie, 254 App. Div. 555, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 191 (1st Dep't 1938).
6 Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 173 N. Y. 492, 499, 66 N. E. 395,
403 (1903); Herlihy v. Phoenix Assur. Co. Ltd., 274 App. Div. 342, 83 N. Y. S. 2d
(3d Dep't 1948).
7 Wylie v. Cox, 15 How. (U. S.) 415, 14 L. Ed. 753 (1853).
s McPherson v. Fox, 96 U. S. 404, 24 L. Ed. 746 (1877).
9 Costigan v. Stewart, 76 Kan. 353, 91 Pac. 83 (1907).
10 Nevills v. Ballard, 18 P. R. 134 (1898).
11 Standige v. Chicago R. Co., 254 Ill. 524, 98 N. E. 963 (1912).
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lien, extending it to cover charges for litigation incident to or occurring out of the
principal object of the employment.' 2 However, some statutes are more restrictive and
specifically limit the charging lien to services rendered during a lawsuit.1 3
Here, although Drewry was entitled to settle its action against Onassis before
judgment, its New York attorneys were not thereby deprived of their right to be paid
for their services.14 The court felt that such a result was in accordance with the equi-
ties since Onassis had actual or constructive knowledge that plaintiffs had rendered
services for Drewry and that a dispute over fees existed.1 5 With such knowledge,
Onassis was bound to retain sufficient funds to discharge the plaintiffs' lien. His fail-
ure to do so made him liable to plaintiffs under the rule that the attorney's lien
attaches to the settlement itself as soon as the agreement to settle is concluded.1 0 The
law will not permit such a defendant to say that he has nothing in his hands to satisfy
the lien of his adversary's attorney. Accordingly, Onassis was held to have settled
with Drewry at his own peril and his failure to withhold funds sufficient to meet the
lien of Drewry's attorney subjected him to liability in that amount.
17
LABOR LAw-LABoR MANAGE.MENT RELATIONS AcT-RIGHT or EMPLOYER TO ADDRESS
E'PLOYEEs oN C amrpAu T=E AND PROPRTY.--Several days prior to an election di-
rected by the National Labor Relations Board (on a petition filed by a labor union for
certification as bargaining representative of respondent's employees at one of its variety
stores) respondent's manager held meetings on store property during working hours.
At these meetings, the manager made anti-union but uncoercive speeches to the em-
ployees. Thereafter, a general organizer of the union requested the store manager to
allow union agents equal opportunity to speak to the employees on the respondent's
property during working hours. This request was refused.
At the election, a majority of the voting employees voted against representation
by the union, which filed charges with the NLRB that the employer violated Section
8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management
Relations Act in 1947. On a petition by the Board for enforcement of its order, based
on a finding that the respondent had violated the Act in rejecting the union's request
and was not protected by the free speech provisions of the Section 8(c),1 enforcement
12 97 A. L. R. 1139 N. (1913).
-3 N. Y. JuDicIARY L. § 475-a.
14 Matter of Levine, 154 Misc. 700, 274 N. Y. Supp. 36 (Surr. Ct. N. Y. Co.
1935), aff'd, 247 App. Div. 191, 286 N. Y. Supp. 513 (1st Dep't 1936).
15 Peri v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 151 N. Y. 521, 46 N. E. 849 (1897).
16 Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 173 N. Y. 492, 66 N. E. 395 (1903);
Levy v. Hirschberg, 85 Misc. 249, 148 N. Y. Supp. 422 (N. Y. C. Mun. Ct. 1914);
Oishei v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 110 App. Div. 709, 97 N. Y. Supp. 447 (1st Dep't
1906).
'7 Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 173 N. Y. 492, 66 N. E. 395 (1903);
Sargent v. McLeod, 209 N. Y. 360, 103 N. E. 164 (1913); Levy v. Grand Central
Wicker Shop, 249 N. Y. 168, 163 N. E. 244 (1928).
1 "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evi-
dence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." Act of July
5, 1935, c. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(c).
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was denied, with one judge dissenting.2 An employer who expresses anti-union views
on his premises during working hours is protected in doing so by the provisions of
Section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, and is not under a legal obligation to give an equal amount of
working time on the premises to the union.
The instant Woolworth case deals with the so-called "captive audience" doctrine,
first enunciated by the Board in the Clark Bros. case,3 which held that an employer
commits an unfair labor practice in making an anti-union speech on company property
during working time and that the "captive audience" context in which the speech is
delivered deprives it of the constitutional protection of the right of free speech.
The legislative history of the Labor Management Relations Act makes it dear
that Section 8(c) was enacted to nullify the holding in the Clark Bros. case.4 But
in Bonwit Teller, Inc.,5  decided after the enactment of Section 8(c), the
Board held that an employer who delivers an anti-union address commits an unfair
labor practice if he denies a request by the union to reply on his time and property.
A divided court granted enforcement of the Board's holding in the Bonwit Teller
case.0 The Woolworth decision expressly disagrees with the holding of the Second Cir-
cuit in the Bonwit Teller case, although pointing out factual differences in the two cases.
A reconstituted Board has more recently repudiated the Bonwit Teller doctrine, reason-
ing that "Bonwit Teller was the discredited Clark Bros. doctrine in scant disguise,
hence contrary to the provisions of Section 8(c) as evidenced by its declared Congres-
sional purpose."18
However, the Board has consistently held that Section 8(c), while insulating the
employer from charges of unfair labor practice, does not detract from the Board's
right to control the election process, and in the exercise of that control, to set aside
elections upon the ground of employer interference, which falls short of being unfair
labor practice.9
In line with this point of view, the Board has recently prescribed as an election
rule, a prohibition against employers' speeches to employees on company premises during
working hours within twenty-four hours prior to a scheduled Board election.10 An
employer's violation of this rule constitutes cause for setting an election aside, and the
directing of a new election. The resulting possibility of successive elections, following
repeated violations of the twenty-four hour rule, raises the question whether a hos-
pitable reception of Section 8(c) should not require that the rule in representation
cases be the same as that governing unfair labor practice cases.
2 N. L. R. B. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F. 2d 78 (8th Cir. 1954).
3 Clark Bros. Co., Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
4 This was recognized by the Board in Babcock & Wilcox & Co., 77 N.L.R.B.
577 (1948); S. & S. Corrugated Paper Machinery Co., Inc., 89 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950).
5 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
6 Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 197 F. 2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. den., 345
U. S. 905, 73 S. Ct. 644, 97 L. Ed. 1342 (1952), explained and limited in NL.R.B. v.
American Tube Bending Co., 205 F. 2d 45 (2d Cir. 1953).
7 Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953). The decision of the Board
is limited to cases where union non-access is denied during working time, and does
not necessarily extend to situations where access to company property is prohibited on
other than working hours.
s Id. at 411.
0 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 N. L. R. B. 935 (1950).
10 Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N. L. R. B. 427 (1953), applied in Spottswood
Specialty Co., 107 N. L. R. B. 1094 (1954).
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In larger perspective, it would seem that the Bonwit Teller doctrine has an ele-
ment of undue subtlety, and frustrates a legislative policy. It is submitted that Sec-
tion 8(c) unwisely repudiated the "captive audience" doctrine and created an unseemly
situation in which men are put under compulsion to listen, whereas the national labor
policy otherwise stresses freedom in choosing union representation.
CRrmNAI LAw-DomEsTic RELATIoNs-LARcENY BY HUSBAND OF WIFE'S PROPERTY.-
The time-honored question of whether a husband may be convicted for the larceny of
the separate property of his wife has been answered in the affirmative by the Court of
Appeals in People v. Morton.' Sections 50 and 51 of the Domestic Relation Law,
which give married women the right to own property, and to sue and be sued with
respect to such property, were held to nullify the old common law rule that there
could be no theft by a husband of his wife's property, since said wife at common
law could have no separate property. This decision affirmed an order of the Appel-
late Division, reversing the County Court, which had dismissed the indictment for lack
of legal sufficiency.
Evidence before the grand jury established the fact that Harry Morton had taken
about $350 of his wife's monies which she had hidden in a paint store she owned. He
was indicted for the crime of grand larceny, second degree, on the basis of her testi-
mony, despite the fact that defendant and complainant were living together as hus-
band and wife at the time of the theft.
Granting the defendant's motion for dismissal upon the grand jury minutes, the
trial judge declared that "The State of New York is a common law state. An act or
omission which was not deemed criminal at common law does not become criminal
unless it be so designated by statutory decree. ' 2
Upon the State's appeal to the Appellate Division, the determination of the trial
court was held to be erroneous, and the order was unanimously modified reinstating
the indictment.3
The Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Desmond, stated that since the wife's
property rights are fully protected in civil actions,4 "to make such protection efficient
and complete she should be allowed to appear as complainant against her husband
when he steals her money or valuables."3 The Court pointed out that there were two
bases for the common law rule that there "could be no such thing as a theft by a
husband from his wife."O These were: 1. the absence of any separate right of property
in a married woman; and 2. "the merger of their beings in the unity of marriage."
7
The Court concluded that neither of these contentions has survived since the passage
of Sees. 50 and 51 of the Domestic Relations Law.
In New York, prior to 1937, it was held that the Married Women's Act did not
abrogate the merger of husband and wife in the unity of marriage, and thus that
neither spouse could sue the other civilly for personal injuries wrongfully inflicted upon
I People v. Morton, 308 N. Y. 96, 123 N. E. 2d 790 (1954).
2 204 Misc. 1063, 1064, 127 N. Y. S. 2d 246, 247 (County Ct. Kings 1953).
3 284 App. Div. 413, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 302 (2d Dep't 1954).
4 Neilitz v. Neilitz, 307 N. Y. 882, 122 N. E. 2d 924 (1954); Wood v. Wood,
83 N. Y. 575 (1881); Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437 (1873); Whitney v. Whitney,
49 Barb. 317 (N. Y. 1867).
5 Supra, note 1, at 99, 123 N. E. 2d at 791.




the other.8 However, even though a husband was not liable civilly for a trespass on
the person of his wife, he could be prosecuted in a criminal action for such a trespass.
By Chapter 669 of the Laws of 1937, however, the legislature amended Sec. 57 of
the Domestic Relations Law, thereby permitting one spouse to sue the other for per-
sonal injuries. Relying on the principle of this amendment, the Court in the instant
case concluded that the legal fiction of unity of husband and wife has been completely
abolished for all purposes, both civil and criminal.
Defendant had contended before the Court of Appeals that the statutory defini-
tion of larceny had not changed materially since 1830.9 He argued that since the
early statutes did not cover misappropriation of a wife's property by her husband,
and since the Married Women's Acts did not refer to larceny, the criminal law, (as
distinguished from the civil law of property rights), remained unchanged. The argu-
ment was advanced that since there was no statute making such a misappropriation
a crime, that such a result would be strictly judicial legislation.
The Court of Appeals disposed of this contention by pointing out that the larceny
statutes refer to the wrongful taking of property of another, and that by virtue of
the Married Women's Acts, the wife is now "another". Thus the present larceny
statutes protect the married woman, as well as any other lawful owner of property,
despite the absence of amendments to such statutes.
Both the reasoning and the result of the Court of Appeals decision follow a pat-
tern of case law adopted by other jurisdictions which have passed Married Women's
Acts similar to §§ 50 and 51 of the Domestic Relations Law. Contrary reasoning has
been followed in a few other states which hold that the Married Women's Acts affect
property rights and contracts only, and do not permit a modification of the status
of marriage by permitting a criminal action in the case of a theft of the property of
a spouse.' 0
The full significance of the decision in the instant case is best reflected by the
opinion of Justice Bediock in the Appellate Division decision in this case. The Justice
said: "The law is not static. The public policy of one generation may not, under
changed conditions, be the public policy of another. Where the reason for a rule ceases,
the rule also ceases. In a determination of the problem here presented, 'we cannot turn
the clock back' to 1829, when the Revised Statutes incorporated the substance of the
present definition of larceny. 'We must consider' the rights of a spouse with relation
to the other 'in the light of its full development and its present place in American
life throughout the Nation.' "'),
8 Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E. 23 (1935); Shubert v. Shubert
Wagon, 249 N. Y. 253, 146 N. E. 42 (1928); La Van Allen v. La Van Allen, 246 N. Y.
571, 159 N. E. 656 (1927); Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644 (1882).
9 Revised Statutes of N. Y. 1829, Part IV, Chap. 1. Title III, Art. 5; cf. N. Y.
Penal Code, Sec. 528 (1881) and present N. Y. PaAL L. § 1290.
10 State v. Koontz, 125 Kan. 216, 257 Pac. 944 (1927); Beasley v. State, 138
Ind. 552, 38 N. E. 35 (1894); Hunt v. State, 72 Ark. 241, 79 S. W. 769 (1904); State
v. Herndon, 158 Fla. 115, 27 So. 2d 833 (1946); Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 181
P. 2d 822 (1947).
1 Supra, note 3 at 417, 132 N. Y. S. 2d at 307.
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FEmEAL ImrrNmTY STATuTE-PowER or FEDERAL COURT TO COMPEt TESTimONY
DEsPIn PossiBix SEw-INcRnm-ATIoir.The constitutionality of the recently enacted
Federal immunity statute' was put in issue for the first time before the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, in the case of In re William
Ludwig Ullman.2
The statute provides that a witness who might otherwise be privileged to refuse
to testify under the protection of the Fifth Amendment, may, if he is accorded a grant
of immunity, be compelled to testify before Congress and its committees, or before
any grand jury or court of the United States "in the course of any investigation re-
lating to any interference with or endangering of, or any plans or attempts to inter-
fere with or endanger the national security of the United States by treason, sabotage,
espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy or the overthrow of its government by force
or violence .... "
The instant court proceedings involved an application by the United States At-
tomey for an order directing one William Ullman to answer questions before a grand
jury which was inquiring into matters involving national security. Ullman had refused
to answer these grand jury questions, invoking the privilege against self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment. In an opinion by Judge Weinfeld in January, 1955,
the court granted the application and directed Ullman to answer the questions pro-
pounded to him.
This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in April, 1955.3
Uliman opposed the government's application on five specific grounds: First, he
urged that the statute was unconstitutional and in contravention of his rights under
the Fifth Amendment in requiring him "to be a witness against himself." 4 He rec-
ognized that immunity statutes have been upheld since Brown v. Walker5 in 1895,
but cited the dissenting opinion in that case and urged reconsideration in the light
of the punitive sanctions and the social and economic consequences which follow self-
exposure under a grant of immunity. The trial court pointed out that any question
of overruling Brown v. Walker was exclusively within the province of the Supreme
Court, and not the District Court; that similar objections had been rejected by the
Supreme Court as recently as Smith v. United States6 in 1949; and that immunity
statutes had been before the Supreme Court in seven cases7 subsequent to Brown v.
Walker.
The second contention of the witness was that the statute failed to grant com-
plete immunity because it still left him subject to prosecution under state laws. He
argued that Congress did not have the constitutional power to bar state prosecutions,
1 68 STAT. 833 (1954), 18 U. S. C. § 3486.
2 128 F. Supp. 617 (S. D. N. Y. 1955).
3 In re Ullman, - F. 2d - (2d Cir. 1955); N. Y. Times, April 5, 1955, p. 15,
col. 4.
4 128 F. Supp. 617, 620, 621.
5 161 U. S. 591, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1895).
6 337 U. S. 137, 147, 69 S. Ct. 1000, 1009, 93 L. Ed. 1264, 1272 (1949).
7 Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372, 26 S. Ct. 78, 50 L. Ed. 234 (1905); Heike v.
United States, 227 U. S. 131, 33 S. Ct. 226, 57 L. Ed. 450 (1913); United States
v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424, 63 S. Ct. 409, 87 L. Ed. 376 (1943); Feldman v. United
States, 322 U. S. 487, 64 S. Ct. 1082, 88 L. Ed. 1408 (1944); Shapiro v. United States,
335 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 1375, 92 L. Ed. 1787 (1948); Smith v. United States, 337 U. S.
137, 69 S. Ct. 1000, 93 L. Ed. 1264 (1949); Adams v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 179, 74
S. Ct. 442, 98 L. Ed. 608 (1954).
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and, even assuming that it had such power, the statute merely prohibited the use
of testimony in a state prosecution and did not immunize the witness against prose-
cution in any state court so long as the testimony itself was not used. The court
answered these arguments by citing the holding of the Supreme Court in Murdock
v. United States.8 There the high court said that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion could not be invoked before a federal tribunal where incrimination was feared
under state law. Consequently, whatever objections might be raised to the rule in the
Murdock case, the decision "is a sufficient answer to the witness' contention as long
as its authority remains unimpaired." 9
Further, in answering the witness' arguments, the court did not limit itself to
the citation of the rule in the Murdock case. It observed that at the time of the
passage of this statute, Congress "intended to afford a witness the fullest protection
by enlarging the scope of immunity to bar state prosecutions as well as the use of
evidence in state courts concerning any matter as to which his testimony has been
compelled." (Emphasis supplied).10 With respect to the power of Congress to pro-
hibit state prosecutions, the court pointed out that the statute in question is specifically
;restricted to offenses involving treason, sabotage, sedition and conspiracy to commit
any of the foregoing, and took the position that "Congress has the constitutional
power, certainly with respect to matters touching upon the national defense or se-
curity, to provide for a grant of immunity in exchange for compelled testimony which
is broad enough to prohibit state prosecutions." 11
The third objection of the witness was that the statute was unconstitutional in
that it required the court to perform a non-judicial function. He argued that the pro-
cedure by which the court was called upon to approve an application for a grant
of immunity gave the court, in effect, a veto power over a determination of the United
States Attorney that the public interest required that immunity be granted to the wit-
ness. This would give the court a power which is peculiarly within the province of
either the legislative or executive branches and such power would do violence to the
concept of separation of powers. With respect to this contention, the court took the
position that the statute did not grant such powers but, on the contrary, limited the
court's function to determining whether "the application complies with the require-
ments specified in that section before the witness may be ordered to answer." "This,"
the court declared, "is clearly a judicial function."'
1 2
The court did point out, however, that the statutory provisions whereby immunity
might be granted to witnesses appearing before Congress or its committees is consid-
erably different from the provisions that apply to grand jury or court proceedings in-
volving national defense or security. It indicated that with respect to the provisions
governing Congress or its committees, the language of the statute "purports to vest
discretion in the court and specifically requires its approval of any grant of im-
munity." (Emphasis supplied).
1 3
The fourth contention of the witness was that the court should overrule the de-
termination by the United States Attorney that a grant of immunity, in return for
compelled testimony, was in the public interest. Here, the court stated that "since
the statute does not vest power in the court to review the determination of the United
8 284 U. S. 141, 52 S. Ct. 63, 76 L. Ed. 210 (1931).
9 128 F. Supp. 617, 622.
10 Id. at 624.
11 Id. at 622.
12 Id. at 625, 626.
13 Id. at 624.
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States Attorney as concurred in by the Attorney General,"14 this contention of the
witness must necessarily fail.
With respect to the final objection of the witness which challenged the propriety
of the questions asked, the court took the position that "since the questions appear
to come within the framework of an inquiry into national defense or security, the
witness 'is not entitled to urge objections of incompetency and immateriality
such as a party might raise since this is no concern of his.15"16 Finally, the court
declared that an order compelling the witness to testify in relation to his membership
and the membership of others in the Communist party did not violate his rights under
the First Amendment. The court said that any question on this score was concluded
in Josephson v. United States17 where the power of Congress to inquire into mem-
bership in the Communist party had been upheld against a similar objection.
This decision was unanimously affirmed three months later by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.' 8 The three judges participating each wrote
a separate opinion. Judge Clark expressed regret that the Court was bound in this
case by the long-standing law on the subject. Judge Galston indicated that in the
absence of ruling cases he would have voted for reversal. Judge Frank, writing the
opinion of the Court, seemed to express the attitude of the entire tribunal when he
said: "Accordingly, [Ullman's] argument must be addressed, not to our ears, but to
eighteen others in Washington."'1 9
M=AnRY LAW-DISCHARGE WITHOUT HONOR rROm NEw YoR NATIONAL GUARD "BY
Co2mrw OF =E GovEmRO" HELD NOT SUBJECT TO JuDICIAL RmvInw-The Court of
Appeals has held, with one dissent, that a "Discharge without Honor" given to an
enlisted man in the New York State National Guard by the Chief of Staff "By Com-
mand of the Governor" is not subject to judicial review.1
The respondent, Gerard E. Nistal, after several previous periods of federal military
service, each terminated by an honorable discharge, enlisted in the New York Air
National Guard in 1947. To the question on the application form, "Were you ever
convicted . . . of any offense," Nistal indicated, "No." He did so after inquiring of
the recruiting officer whether his two previous convictions by courts-martial, recorded
on his discharge certificates, required an affirmative answer. In response, the
officer said that the question referred only to criminal convictions in civilian
courts. In December, 1950, Nistal requested an honorable discharge before his enlist-
ment expired, in order to assume a position in the defense effort of the United States.
After a hearing before a Discharge Board, Nistal was discharged "without honor" be-
cause of his "fraudulent enlistment," in that he failed to list his two convictions by
courts-martial. The order granting this discharge was signed by the appellant,
Hausauer, as Chief of Staff "By Command of the Governor."
'4 Id. at 628.
'5 Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 282, 39 S. Ct. 468, 471, 63 L. Ed. 979,
984 (1919).
36 128 F. Supp. 617, 628.
17 165 F. 2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947). Accord: Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241
(D. C. Cir. 1948); Lawson v. United States, 176 F. 2d 49 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
Is Supra, note 3.
19 - F. 2d -, -.
1 Nistal v. Hausauer, 308 N. Y. 146, 124 N. E. 2d 94 (1954).
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In June, 1952, Nistal filed a petition2 in the Supreme Court under Article 78 of
the Civil Practice Act for an order directing Hausauer to issue him an honorable
discharge. Hausauer made a cross-motion to dismiss3 the proceedings for want of juris-
diction and for failure to bring the action within the requisite time.4 Special Term
granted the cross-motion, and dismissed the proceedings on the jurisdictional ground.5
In so doing, it held that the relief demanded was solely within the power of the Gov-
ernor.
The Appellate Division (two justices dissenting without opinion) reversed the order
and reinstated Nistal's petition.6 The court contended that the appeal presented an
important question relative to the power of judicial review. It held that the act to
shorten the term of Nistal's enlistment was an executive function, but that the "with-
out honor" characterization of his discharge was tantamount to the exercise of a judi-
cial function. It said that a characterization which impugned the character or reputa-
tion of a citizen could only be made by a court, notwithstanding the fact that a
trial might disclose that there were good reasons for the action taken by an adminis-
trative Discharge Board.7
The Appellate Division argued that neither Reid v. United States,8 nor Matter of
Bianco v. Austin,9 two cases relied upon by Special Term, supported the position of
Hausauer in this case. On the contrary, it contended that the latter case recognized the
jurisdiction of the state courts to secure the discharge of a member of the National
Guard of New York State. The Court also relied on People ex rel. Smith v. Hoffman,10
which held that the Supreme Court has power to issue a writ of certiorari to review
the determination of a military board of examination.
Upon application, the Appellate Division certified to the Court of Appeals ques-
tions as to jurisdiction of subject matter, jurisdiction over the person of Hausauer,
and sufficiency of the petition.
In reversing the Appellate Division and reinstating the order of Special Term
dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals held that while it had in personam juris-
diction over Hausauer, it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. It held that
shortening the term of enlistment was a discretionary act of the executive, not sub-
ject to court review; and further, that even if the executive decision were judicial in
nature, but was made by the governor or by his order, it would not be subject to
review on a writ of certiorari.1 1
The Hoffman case,12 which held that a decision by a military board concerning the
fitness of a commissioned officer was a judicial determination subject to court review,
was distinguished by the Court on the ground that Nistal was an enlisted man. The
2 Nistal v. Hausauer, 203 Misc. 89, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 75 (Sup. Ct., Spec. T., N. Y.
Co., 1952).
3 N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act, § 1293.
4 N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act, Art. 78.
5 See note 2, supra.
6 Nistal v. Hausauer, 282 App. Div. 7, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 712 (lst Dep't 1953).
7 Ibid.
8 161 Fed. 469 (S. D. N. Y. 1908), writ of 'error dismissed, 211 U. S. 529, 20 S. Ct.
171, 53 L. Ed. 313 (1908).
9 204 App. Div. 34, 197 N. Y. Supp. 328 (1st Dep't 1922).
10 166 N. Y. 462, 60 N. E. 187, 54 L. R. A. 597 (1901).
11 People ex rel. Broderick v. Morton, 156 N. Y. 136, 50 N. E. 791, 66 Am.
St. Rep. 547, 41 L. R. A. 231 (1898).
12 166 N. Y. 462, 60 N. E. 187, 54 L. R. A. 597 (1901).
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result in the Haffman case was dictated by a provision of the State Constitution 18
which requires a trial and findings for the removal of an officer, but is silent as to
enlisted men. Here, the Court of Appeals found that Nistal's voluntary application
reposed ". . . discretion in the military authorities as to what kind of discharge should
be granted. .. ;-14 and the Court concluded in the words of Special Term, that
".. . since the Governor has, through his Chief of Staff, ordered this discharge in
the present case, the civil courts cannot review it."'1 5
The Court admitted that this form of discharge was probably damaging to Nistal's
reputation and to his prospects in life, but pointed out that the question before the
court was a purely legal issue as to whether the discharge can or cannot be reviewed
by the civil courts. Quoted with approval was the admonition of the United States
Supreme Court that ".. . judges are not given the task of running the army... -l1
In the Hoffman case,1 7 the Court of Appeals observed that there was a conflict
between the courts of the different states as to the right of civilian courts to review
the judgments of military tribunals,1 8 and that although the courts of England do re-
view such judgments, they do so with extreme caution.19 The general rule appears to
be that federal civil courts will review military decisions only in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings,2 0 and will refuse to do so with reference to determination of army discharge
review boards.2 '
'3 N. Y. CONsT. Art. XII, § 6.
14 308 N. Y. 146, 147, 124 N. E. 2d 94, 97 (1954).
15 Id. at 149, 124 N. E. 2d at 97.
16 Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 73 S. Ct. 534, 544, 97 L. Ed. 842, 852
(1953), reh. denied, 345 U. S. 931, 73 S. Ct. 779, 97 L. Ed. 1360 (1953).
"7 166 N. Y. 462, 60 N. E. 187, 54 L. R. A. 597 (1901).
Is Durham v. United States, 4 Hayw. (Tenn.) 54 (Sup. Ct. Errors and App.,
1817); State v. Davis, 4 N. J. L. 311 (Sup. Ct., 1816); Re Contested Election of
Brigadier General, 1 Strobh. (S. C.) 190 (Ct. of Appeals, 1847).
19 Grant v. Gould, 2 H. Black. 69, 101, 126 Eng. Rep. 434, 451 (1792); In re
Mansergh, 1 Best & Smith 400, 121 Eng. Rep. 764 (1861); 1 Winthrop M. L. 57
(1847); In re Poe, 5 Barn. & Ad. 681, 110 Eng. Rep. 942 (1833).
20 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 73 S. Ct. 1045, 97 L. Ed. 1508 (1953).
21 Gentila v. Pace, 90 U. S. App. D. C. 75, 193, 196 Fed. 2d 924, 926 (D. C.
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 943, 72 S. Ct. 556, 96 L. Ed. 702 (1952).
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